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Abstract: We provide a technique for constructing optimal multiattribute screening contracts in a general
setting with one-dimensional types based on necessary optimality conditions. Our approach allows for type-
dependent participation constraints and arbitrary risk proles. As an example we discuss optimal insurance
contracts.
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1. Introduction
Starting with the seminal contribution by Mirrlees [1], optimal screening contracts have found
many applications in economics, including taxation, nonlinear pricing, and the regulation of mo-
nopolies [1{4]. The underlying game of asymmetric information contains two periods. In the rst
period, the principal announces a menu of attribute bundles to an agent who possesses private infor-
mation about his utility function, and who can select an attribute bundle by sending a message to
the principal. In the second period, allocations are made according to a publicly known enforceable
mapping from the message space to both attribute bundles and monetary transfers from agent to
principal. Subject to the agent's participation constraint (individual rationality) and the agent's
self-interested choice behavior (incentive compatibility), an optimal screening menu maximizes the
principal's expected payo. In this paper, which is related to [5, 6], we provide an explicit method
to construct optimal screening contracts with continuously distributed, one-dimensional \types"
representing the agents' private information and multiple instruments (or attributes), based on
necessary optimality conditions. The problem of nding optimal screening contracts can be for-
mulated as an optimal control problem, for which we derive necessary optimality conditions using
the maximum principle by Pontryagin et al. [7] and the technique of successive approximation [8].
In this vein, the method approximates an optimal schedule by directly computable solutions to a
sequence of relaxed screening problems. We allow for type-dependent participation constraints and
payo functions that are nonlinear in each contract instrument. This is useful when considering
the eects of variable outside options and/or risk-aversion on the optimal contracts. The set of
participating types is also subject to optimization.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce a general model for multiattribute
screening and formulate the principal's optimization problem in an optimal-control setting. In
Section 3, we provide a full set of necessary optimality conditions that can be used to construct
a solution to the screening problem, including an iterative approximation method. In Section 4,
we discuss the design of a menu of optimal insurance contracts for an agent with unknown risk
aversion as a practical example. Section 5 concludes.
1This paper was presented as a plenary lecture in October 2016 in Ekaterinburg, at the International
Conference on \Systems Analysis: Modeling and Control" in memory of Academician Arkady Kryazhimskiy.
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2. Model
2.1. Screening Problem
We consider a standard screening setup with a principal (\she") and an agent (\he"). The
agent's possible type , known only to him, lies in the type space  = [0; 1].2 The type  summarizes
all the private information the agent has. From the principal's viewpoint it is distributed with the
continuous probability density f = _F on the support .3 The principal designs a schedule of
instruments (or attributes) x = (x0; x1; : : : ; xn) : ! Rn+1+ so as to maximize her expected payo,
V (x; 0) =
Z 1
0
V (x(); )f() d; (2.1)
where n  1 is a given integer which denotes the number of attributes characterizing the bundle,
and 0 = [0; 1]   is the set of participating types, with the marginal type 0 2  subject to
optimization.4 In order to ensure implementability of a favored attribute schedule, the principal's
optimization problem is subject to the agent's self-interested behavior, which manifests itself in
the form of two constraints. First, given that an agent of type  has net utility U(; ) for a
bundle  2 Rn+1+ , the optimal type announcement # satises the incentive-compatibility constraint
U(x(#); )  U(x(^); ); 8#; ^ 2 0: (2.2)
Second, since the agent is free to walk away from the principal's proposed menu of contracts
(attribute schedule), the participation set 0 is dened by the agent's participation constraint
#;  2 0 , U(x(#); )  U(0; ): (2.3)
That is, an agent of type  participates if by pretending to be any other participating agent
type # (including himself) he achieves a utility that is at least equal to the utility derived from a
zero bundle (corresponding to nonparticipation). The principal's screening problem is to nd an
(absolutely continuous) attribute schedule x() which maximizes the objective in (2.1) subject to
the implementability constraints (2.2) and (2.3).
2.2. Key Assumptions
The attribute x0 corresponds to a numeraire good such as a monetary transfer from the agent
to the principal.5 The principal's payo function V : Rn+1 ! R is continuously dierentiable
in the attribute vector x and continuous in the type . In addition, we make the following two
assumptions on V .
P1. Vx0 > 0 > Vxi for all i 2 f1; : : : ; ng (P-Monotonicity).6
P2. V (0; )  0 for all  2  (Possibility of Inaction).
2Using a simple ane transformation this does in fact allow for any compact interval on the real line.
3Throughout we use the dot-notation for total derivatives with respect to , e.g., _F = dFd .
4The problem of maximizing the principal's expected utility can be viewed as a \dynamic optimization
problem" if V (x; 0) represents an average payo generated by a trajectory x() on the time interval [0; 1],
where the starting time 0 is subject to optimization. The methods presented in this paper extend to intervals
of the form [0; 1] where both boundaries are subject to optimization (cf. footnote 23).
5We sometimes use x to denote bundles (i.e., points) in the attribute space Rn+1+ = fx^ 2 Rn+1 : x^  0g
rather than full schedules (i.e., functions); the same `notational exibility' is used for components xi of x.
6Throughout the text, we denote partial derivatives using subscripts, e.g., Vx0 = @V=@x0.
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Agent type 's net utility from the bundle x is U(x; ), where U : Rn+2 ! R is a twice
continuously dierentiable function. His outside option (which is realized after not agreeing to any
of the principals' proposed contracts) yields the reservation utility r() = U(0; ), where r : R! R
is a continuously dierentiable function. We make the following three assumptions on U .
A1. For all (x; ) 2 Rn+1+  : (i) U(0; x1; : : : ; xn; )  _r(), and (ii) Uxi(x; ) > 0 > Ux0(x; )
for all i 2 f1; : : : ; ng (A-Monotonicity).
A2. For all (x1; : : : ; xn; ) 2 Rn+  : (i) U(0; x1; : : : ; xn; )  r() (Attribute Desirability),
and (ii) r() > limx0!1 U(x0; x1; : : : ; xn; ) (Transfer Sensitivity).
A3. For all (x; ) 2 Rn+1++ : jUxi0(x; )j > 0 for some i0 2 f1; : : : ; ng (Incentive Regularity).7
Finally, to exclude unbounded screening contracts, the gains from trade between the principal
and the agent need to be bounded. To formalize this notion, we rst introduce the principal's
equivalent variation E(x1; : : : ; xn; ), which corresponds to the minimum payment in terms of the
numeraire good x0 she would be willing to accept to provide the attribute bundle (x1; : : : ; xn) to
the agent, i.e.,
E(x1; : : : ; xn; ) = inffx0 2 R+ : V (x0; x1; : : : ; xn; )  0g; (2.4)
where we adopt the convention that inf ; = 1. On the other hand, agent type 's compensating
variation C(x1; : : : ; xn; ) is his maximum willingness to pay (in terms of x0) for the attribute
bundle (x1; : : : ; xn) provided by the principal, i.e.,
C(x1; : : : ; xn; ) = sup fx0 2 R+ : U(x0; x1; : : : ; xn; )  r()g ; (2.5)
where we adopt the convention that sup ; =  1. The following assumption guarantees that
gains from trade between principal and agent exist and the contracts between the two involve only
bounded attribute bundles. Let
X = f(x0; x1; : : : ; xn) 2 Rn+1+ : C(x1; : : : ; xn; )  x0  E(x1; : : : ; xn; ) and  2 g
be the (feasible) contract space.8
T1. X is bounded (Bounded Contract Space).
We now comment on the six assumptions P1, P2, A1{A3, and T1. Assumption P2 bounds
the principal's value of the screening problem from below by zero, since the zero schedule x = 0
is always feasible. Assumption P1 means that the principal's preferences are nonsatiated in the
numeraire good. The monotonicity of the principal's payo with respect to the non-numeraire
attributes (x1; : : : ; xn) is unimportant and can be relaxed in situations which involve cooperation
between the principal and the agent. Correspondingly, we assume in A1(ii) that the agent dislikes
paying the numeraire to the principal, but nds all other attributes desirable. The rst inequality
in P1 and A1(ii) can be always satised by relabelling and simple sign-transformations, as long
as there is one attribute that both the principal and the agent like, so it is possible for the agent
to compensate the principal for her actions regarding the other attributes. Assumption A1(i)
guarantees that the set of participating types is convex (of the form 0 = [0; 1] for some 0 2
7Without any loss of generality, we assume in what follows that i0 = 1; furthermore, Rn+1++ = int(R
n+1
+ ).
8The equivalent and compensating variations are classical welfare measures [9]. A normative relationship
between them, in particular a lack of exchange due to the endowment eect (when E > C) for identical
individuals, is discussed by [10]. Here, assumptions A1 and P1 imply that the contracting parties' preferences
dier, and assumptions A2 and P2 that gains from trade exist.
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[0; 1]) and includes the highest type  = 1,9 as long as it is nonempty. The latter is guaranteed
by P2, since the principal can always provide the zero-attribute bundle at no disbenet. The rst
inequality in A2 means that any agent always accepts the bundle (0; x1; : : : ; xn) 2 Rn+1+ when he
obtains the non-numeraire attributes for free. The second inequality means that for any attribute
vector (x1; : : : ; xn) 2 Rn+ there is a price (in terms of x0) that is too high. The incentive-regularity
condition A3 requires that the agent perceives increasing (or decreasing) dierences with respect to
one non-numeraire attribute and his type. This condition is needed only in a neighborhood of points
where the agents' incentive compatibility becomes a binding constraint. Finally, the assumption T1
stipulating that the gains from trade be bounded is naturally satised in any practical situation,
e.g., when both U and V are bounded and there exists an " such that Ux0 <  " < 0 < " < Vx0 .
Intuitively it is enough when the principal's marginal costs  Vxi of providing a bundle (to a given
agent type) increase fast enough in the attributes, and at the same time the agent's marginal
utilities Uxi for these attributes decrease. Assumption T1 guarantees that the solution to the
principal's screening problem behaves as if it were constrained to attribute schedules with values in
the set X without the need for an explicit consideration of this constraint. Note that assumptions P2
and A2 imply that the contract space is nonempty, as it must contain the zero bundle, i.e., 0 2 X .
3. Optimal Screening Contracts
We treat the screening problem in an optimal-control framework. Accordingly, the admissible
schedules x :  ! Rn+1+ are in the Sobolev space W1;1 of absolutely continuous functions with
essentially bounded derivatives, and the corresponding class of admissible controls u : ! Rn is the
Lebesgue space L1 of all essentially bounded functions. An admissible marginal type is any 0 2 .
Correspondingly, let D = L1(;Rn+1+ ) W1;1(;Rn)   be the domain of admissibility for
solutions (x; u; 0) to the screening problem.10
Theorem 1. Under assumptions P1 and A1{A2, the principal's screening problem can be writ-
ten in the form:
sup
(x;u;0)2D
V (x; 0); (P)
subject to
_x = (x; )u; U(x(0); 0) = r(0); (3.1)
and
min
^20
n
(^   )

U(x(^); )  U(x(); )
o
 0; (3.2)
for all  2 0 = [0; 1], where 11
(x; ) =

'(x; )
In

2 R(n+1)n; '(x; ) =  (Ux1(x; ); : : : ; Uxn(x; ))
Ux0(x; )
 0; (3.3)
and In denotes an (n n)-identity matrix.
P r o o f. Given an admissible schedule x : ! Rn+1, we conclude from A1 that U(x(^); 1) 
r(1)  U(x(^); 0)   r(0) for any ^; 1; 0 2  with 1  0. Thus, type 0's participation
9Convexity of 0 can be achieved also when U   r is only quasiconcave in  [11], in which case the upper
marginal type becomes subject to optimization also.
10At an optimal solution (x; u; 0), the schedule x
 and control u need only be dened on the optimal
participation set 0 = [

0 ; 1]  .
11A vector y = (y1; : : : ; yn) 2 Rn satises y  0 if and only if yi  0 for all i 2 f1; : : : ; ng.
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implies participation for all types  2 0 = [0; 1]. Since by P1 and A1 it is Vx0 > 0 > Ux0 , the
lowest participating type 0 cannot get any surplus, so necessarily U(x(0); 0) = r(0). The lowest
type 0 is itself subject to optimization. Equation (3.1) states that d(x1; : : : ; xn)=d = u, where u
is subject to optimization. When searching for schedules x :  ! Rn+1 that maximize expected
prots V (x; 0), by the revelation principle [12,13] the principal can restrict attention to schedules
under which all types report truthfully,12 so
U(x(); )  U(x(^); ) (3.4)
for all ; ^ 2 . The incentive-compatibility condition (3.4) is equivalent to (3.1){(3.3). To prove
this, we rst show that (3.4) implies (3.1){(3.3). Indeed, by subtracting U(x(^); ^) from (3.4) and
switching the labels for  and ^ we obtain that
U(x(); )  U(x(^); ^)  U(x(^); )  U(x(^); ^)
and
U(x(^); ^)  U(x(); )  U(x(); ^)  U(x(); ):
Combining the last two inequalities yields
U(x(); )  U(x(); ^)  U(x(); )  U(x(^); ^)  U(x(^); )  U(x(^); ^) (3.5)
for all ; ^ 2 . Selecting any ^;  2 int and taking the limit for ^ ! + and  !   we get
dU(x(); )
d
= U(x(); )
almost everywhere (a.e.) on , which is equivalent to
Ux(x(); ) _x() = 0: (3.6)
The last equation denes the system dynamics _x() = (x(); )u() on 0, as specied in (3.1)
and (3.3). Note that _x0() = '(x(); ) by solving (3.6) for _x0. The fact that
'(x; ) = ('1(x; ); : : : ; 'n(x; ))  0
(componentwise) follows directly from A1. Since by admissibility of the menu x and smoothness
of U , the function U(x(); ) is absolutely continuous in , by the fundamental theorem of calculus
[14, p. 134] it is
U(x(^); ^)  U(x(); ) =
Z ^

U(x(#); #) d#: (3.7)
The fundamental theorem of calculus also implies that
U(x(^); ^)  U(x(^); ) =
Z ^

U(x(^); #) d#; (3.8)
so by subtracting (3.7) from (3.8) one can rewrite the rst inequality in (3.5) in the formZ ^

h
U(x(^); #)  U(x(#); #)
i
d#  0
12The revelation principle describes the (almost trivial) fact that when the principal is able to commit to
a mechanism (i.e., an allocation function x^ :  ! X ) by solving the agent's problem (2.2) of announcing a
type # = #() 2 0 that maximizes his expected utility, she can simply choose x, with x() 7! x^(#()),
instead of x^ to obtain a mechanism that reveals the agent's type truthfully.
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for all ; ^ 2 . This last inequality holds for all ; ^ 2  if and only if(
U(x(^); )  U(x(); ); if ^ > ;
U(x(^); )  U(x(); ); if ^ < ;
i.e., if and only if the single-crossing condition (3.2) is satised for all  2 0. Hence, condition (3.4)
is necessary for conditions (3.1){(3.3) in Theorem 1. In order to show that conditions (3.1){(3.3) are
also sucient for the incentive compatibility constraint (3.4), consider any ^;  2  and rewrite (3.4)
using the integral representation (3.7) and the fundamental theorem of calculus as
U(x(); )  U(x(^); ^) =
Z 
^
U(x(#); #) d# 
Z 
^
U(x(^); #) d# = U(x(^); )  U(x(^); ^);
or in the more compact form Z ^

h
U(x(^); #)  U(x(#); #)
i
d#  0:
This last inequality holds for all ^;  2  if and only if U(x; ) exhibits the single-crossing prop-
erty (3.2) for all  2 , which yields the desired suciency of (3.1){(3.3) for (3.4). As alluded to
earlier, the initial condition in (3.1) is due to the agent's participation constraint, U(x(); )  r()
for all  2 0. By A2, the set of participating types 0 is nonempty (given that X 6= ;). 
The intuition for the system dynamics in (3.1) is that, except for the component x0 (which
contains the agent's payment in the numeraire good), the rate of change of the principal's schedule x
as a function of the type  is governed by the control variable u. The dynamics of the system are
constrained by the fact that a participating agent  2 [0; 1] needs to nd it optimal to report his
type truthfully, such that U(x(); )  U(x(^); ). In other words, by consuming a bundle x(^)
possibly dierent from the bundle x() designed for him, agent  cannot be better o. This incentive
compatibility (or \implementability") is responsible for the dynamics of x0 and the constraint (3.2).
The latter constraint renders problem (P) a nonstandard optimal control problem,13 for it involves
the schedule x generically at dierent points of the type space. Hence, the corresponding necessary
optimality conditions, summarized by the following result, dier from standard versions of the
maximum principle. The existence of a solution to (P) is implied by [11, Thm. 2]. We now provide
a set of necessary optimality conditions.
Theorem 2. Given that assumption T1 is satised, let (x; u; 0) be an optimal solution to
the screening problem (P) and let 0 = [0; 1] be the corresponding set of participating types. Then
there exists a function  = ( 0; : : : ;  n) : 

0 ! Rn+1 of bounded variation, a constant 0  0, and
a nonnegative Borel measure , such that the following optimality conditions are satised.
C1. Adjoint Equation:  () 2 Rn+1 satises
 () =
Z 1

(0Vx(x
; #)f(#) +  0'x(x; #)u) d# 
Z 1

((x; #)  #)Ux(x; #) d;
for all  2 0, where the measurable selection  satises 14
(x; ) 2 arg min
^20
n
(^   )

U(x
(^); )  U(x; )
o
;
13In the remainder of the text, references to problem (P) (or to its relaxation (P') introduced below)
include the complete problem setting with assumptions and relevant constraints.
14A set-valued minimizer of a continuous function over a compact set is nonempty, compact-valued, and
upper semi-continuous in . It therefore has a measurable selection [15, p. 44].
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for any (x; ) 2 Rn+1 0.
C2. Maximality:
ui () 6= 0 )  0()'i(x(); ) +  i() = 0;
a.e. on 0, for all i 2 f1; : : : ; ng.
C3. Transversality:
(i) 0 = 0 ) 91 2 R :  (0) + 1Ux(x(0); 0) = 0;
(ii) 0 > 0 )  (0) (U(x(0); 0)  _r(0)) + 0V (x(0); 0)Ux(x(0); 0) = 0.
C4. Complementary Slackness:
supp() 
(
 2  : min
^20
n
(^   )

U(x
(^); )  U(x(); )
o
= 0
)
:
C5. Nontriviality: 0 + sup20 k ()k > 0.
P r o o f. See appendix. 
The adjoint variable  () corresponds to the shadow value of the optimal attribute schedule at
type , given that the evolution of the optimal schedule satises the ordinary dierential equation
(ODE) in (3.1) as well as the incentive-compatibility constraint (3.2). The adjoint equation C1
describes the evolution of  on the set of participating types. In particular, the shadow value of the
attribute schedule vanishes for the highest type,  = 1. The maximality condition C2 requires that
the optimal control u can be essentially bounded only if, while maximizing the principal's expected
payo, the gradient of u with respect to u (corresponding to the right-hand side of (3.1)) vanishes.
The transversality condition C3 is implied by the optimality of the marginal agent of type 0, who
is indierent between participating or not. If 0 is not a boundary solution (i.e., when 0 > 0),
condition C3 (ii) means that the total change in value, as measured by the agent's marginal surplus
through the change in his type movement (evaluated at the shadow value  (0)) plus his marginal
utility for the attribute bundle (evaluated at the principal's net payo V (x(0); 0)) must vanish
for the indierent type 0. If it is optimal to serve all agents (i.e., when 0 = 0), one obtains a
distortion of the shadow values described by the transversality condition C3 (i). The complementary
slackness condition C4 shows that the support of the measure  must be inside the set of types
for which the incentive-compatibility constraint (3.2) is binding. Thus, if (3.2) is never binding,
then  vanishes. Condition C5 ensures that the necessary optimality conditions are nontrivial in the
sense that 0 and  cannot vanish together. This can imply an important simplication: if  = 0,
then necessarily 0 > 0, so that, without any loss in generality, we can set 0 = 1, since all other
optimality conditions are positively homogeneous in 0.
It is generally dicult to construct a measure  without the precise knowledge of x, since 
is dened using x and 0. When taking the limit ^ !  in the maximand of the left-hand side
in (3.2), the following constraint is implied:
  u  0; (3.2')
where  = (1; 2; : : : ; n) and j = Uxj=Ux1 corresponds to the agent's marginal rate of substitu-
tion (with respect to U) between x1 and xj for j 2 f2; : : : ; ng. We refer to (P) with constraint (3.2)
replaced by (3.2') therefore as the relaxed screening problem (P'). Contrary to the screening prob-
lem (P), the relaxed screening problem (P') can be solved explicitly.
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Theorem 3. Under assumptions P1, P2, and A1{A3, if (x; u; 0) is an optimal solution to
the relaxed screening problem (P'), then there exists an absolutely continuous function  : ! Rn+1
such that the transversality condition C3 is satised, and 15
  _ = Vx(x; )f() + ( 0'x(x; ) + x(x; ))u;  (1) = 0; (3.9)
and
[ 0'x + x;]u
 =  0' +    fVx; (3.10)
where  =  0'1(x
; ) +  1, and   u = 0.
P r o o f. Apply the optimality conditions in Theorem 2 to the optimal control problem (P').
For this, consider the Hamiltonian H = 0V f +   u, and rst examine the case where the
constraint (3.2') is not binding, i.e., where   u > 0. If the optimal control u is \proper," i.e.,
independent of u, then the maximality condition with respect to the relaxed screening problem (P')
implies that Hu =   = 0 on an optimal state-control trajectory. Dierentiating both sides with
respect to , taking into account the adjoint equation, yields
  _ i =   (Vx0f +  0'x0  u)'i +  0'i;xu +  0'i; = Vxif +  0'xi  u (3.11)
for any i 2 f1; : : : ; ng. These n equations can be rewritten more compactly in the form
[ 0'x;]u
 =  0'   fVx: (3.12)
In the case where  u = 0, maximization of the Hamiltonian subject to (3.2') yields the optimality
condition   = , where   0 is the corresponding Lagrange multiplier. The rst component of
this condition yields that  =  0'1(x
; ) +  1 as claimed. 
The Lagrange multiplier  is associated with the relaxed incentive-compatibility constraint (3.2').
By eliminating u from the above relations and from (3.1), a solution to the relaxed screening prob-
lem can therefore be obtained by solving a system of n+ 3 ODEs.
Corollary 1. Let assumptions P1, P2, and A1{A3 be satised, and let (x; u; 0) be an opti-
mal solution to the relaxed screening problem (P'). (i) If the matrix R = ['x;] is nonsingular at
the optimal solution, then there exist absolutely continuous functions  0;  1 : 

0 ! R such that(
_x = R 1

'   fVx 0

;
  _ 0 = Vx0f + 'x0R 1 ( 0'   fVx) ;
(3.13)
provided that R 1

'   fVx 0

> 0. (ii) Otherwise, setting ^ = (2; : : : ; n) and u^ = (u2; : : : ; un)),
there exist absolutely continuous functions  0;  1 : 

0 ! R such that8<: _x
 = ^
h
 0'^x +  1^x; ^
i 1 
 0'^ +  1^   fVx^

;
  _ i = Vxif + ( 0'^xi +  1^xi)
h
 0'^x +  1^x; ^
i 1 
 0'^ +  1^   fVx^

;
(3.14)
for i 2 f0; 1g. (iii) The boundary conditions for both (3.13) and (3.14) are U(x(0); 0) = r(0)
and  (1) = 0.
15Given two matrices A 2 Rml and B 2 Rlm, where m; l are positive integers, the Lie bracket of A
and B is given by [A;B] = AB   (AB)T = AB  BTAT 2 Rmm, where ()T denotes the transpose of ().
Optimal Multiattribute Screening 95
To obtain the n + 2 initial values x(0) and 0 for the system (3.13), one can use the n + 1
transversality conditions C3 in conjunction with the initial condition in (3.1).
Remark 1. In the case where all payo functions are quasilinear in the numeraire, it is 'x0 = 0
and Vx0 = 1, which implies that  0() = 1  F () by virtue of (3.13), provided that
1;
Ux2
Ux1
; : : : ;
Uxn
Ux1

 ['x;] 1

'   f
1  F Vx

 0: (3.15)
The last inequality can be checked ex ante. It generalizes the standard Spence|Mirrlees sort-
ing condition [16, Eq. (7), p. 155]. Note that the last inequality (3.15) features all primitives of
the problem, and it is satised if the relaxed incentive-compatibility constraint (3.2') is not binding.
Remark 2. In the case where R = 0, as in the optimal insurance example discussed in Section 4,
relation (3.10) immediately implies that
 0' +  = fVx: (3.16)
Solving this n-dimensional optimality condition, one can determine real-valued functions qi, such
that
xi = qi(x0; ;  0); i 2 f1; : : : ; ng; (3.17)
which then allows for the solution of the Hamiltonian system consisting of the state equation in (3.1)
and the adjoint equation (3.9).
If the solution to the relaxed screening problem (P') is feasible in the screening problem (P),
then it is also a solution to the principal's screening problem. Failing that, we can approximate
an optimal solution to (P) by solutions to appropriate relaxed problems. For this we introduce a
sequence of relaxed screening problems f(P 0kl)gk;l1. For any k; l  1, problem (P 0kl) is identical to
problem (P') with V replaced by
V kl(x; ) = V (x; )  k

g (x; ;xk 1;l 1)
2   l x  xk 1;l 12 ;
and
g (x; ;xk 1;l 1) = min
^2[k0 ;1]
n
0; (^   )

U(x
k 1;l 1(^); )  U(x; )
o
for any (x; ) 2 Rn+1  . We denote a solution to problem (P 0kl) by (xkl; ukl; kl0 ). To initialize
the sequence of relaxed screening problem, we set V 00 = V , thus adding a problem (P 000) which is
identical to problem (P'); its solution (x00; u00; 000 ) is therefore described by our earlier results.
Theorem 4. (i) For any given k  1, the sequence (xkl; ukl; kl0 )	l1 of solutions to (P 0kl)
converges to (xk; uk; k0) 2 W1;1  L1  . (ii) The sequence

(xk; uk; k0)
	
k1 converges to a
solution (x; u; 0) of (P).
P r o o f. (i) Fix any k  1. The sequence fxklgl1 is by construction a Cauchy sequence
in the Banach space L2(), and therefore converges strongly. This implies weak convergence of
the sequence fuklgl1. Lastly, by the Bolzano|Weierstrass theorem the sequence fkl0 gl1  
contains a convergent subsequence with limit in . Consider the limits k0  ^k0 of any two such
convergent subsequences. Then U(xk(k0); 
k
0) = r(
k
0) and U(x
k(^k0); ^
k
0) = r(^
k
0). On the other
hand, as already noted in the proof of Theorem 1, by A1 for any  2 [k0 ; 1] it is U(x(); k0) r(k0) 
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U(x(); ^k0) r(^k0), so necessarily U(x(); ) r() = 0 for all  2 [k0 ; ^k0 ]. Without loss of generality,
we can therefore take k0 = lim inf l!1 kl0 . The limit (xk; uk; k0) solves the relaxed screening
problem (P') with V replaced by V k(x; ) = V (x; ) k  g (x; ;xk)2. (ii) The convergence of the
sequence fk0gk1   to 0 2  obtains as in part (i). Furthermore, any limit (x; u; 0) of the
sequence

(xk; uk; k0)
	
k1 satises g (x
(); ;x) = 0 a.e. on 0, and is thus a feasible solution
to the screening problem (P), provided that (x; u) 2 W1;1  L1. The latter follows from the
existence of a solution to (P). 
4. Application: Optimal Insurance
Consider the problem of designing a nonlinear insurance contract with multiple contingencies,
which dates back at least to Stiglitz [17]. An agent has constant absolute risk aversion  2  =
[0; 1].16 The type parameter  belongs to the agent's private information, and|from the principal's
point of view|it is distributed with the dierentiable probability density f > 0 on the type
space .17 The agent's utility for any real-valued monetary payo  is
v(; ) =   exp ( ) ;
and his current wealth is zero. The agent faces n possible, mutually exclusive loss events L1; : : : ; Ln,
which are ordered by magnitude such that 0 < L1 <    < Ln <1. The probability of loss event Li
is pi > 0, so p0 = 1   (p1 +    + pn) 2 (0; 1) is the probability that no loss event occurs.18 An
insurance contract subsidizes the agent by an amount xi when loss event Li occurs, and asks the
agent for a net payment of x0 in the absence of a loss. Given an insurance contract x = (x0; : : : ; xn),
the agent's expected utility is
U(x; ) = p0v( x0; ) +
nX
i=1
piv(xi   Li; ):
The agent's reservation utility without contract is therefore
r() = U(0; ) =  p0 +
nX
i=1
piv( Li; ):
On the other hand, the principal's expected payo is
V (x; ) = p0x0  
nX
i=1
pixi;
independent of . It is straightforward to verify that both the agent and the principal have utility
functions which satisfy assumptions A1{A3 and P1{P2, respectively. The principal's equivalent
variation in (2.4) is
E(x1; : : : ; xn; ) =
nX
i=1

pi
p0

xi;
while the agent's compensating variation in (2.5) takes the form
C(x1; : : : ; xn; ) =

1


ln
"
1 +
nX
i=1

pi
p0

eLi

1  e xi
#
:
16By a change of units (i.e., renormalization) this is without loss of generality; cf. also footnote 2.
17To satisfy assumption T1, the agent's risk aversion needs to be strictly positive. By considering =
instead of , the analysis generalizes to positive risk aversions in [0; ], for any  > 0.
18The vector (p0; : : : ; pn) lies in the interior of the n-simplex n = f(p^0; : : : ; p^n) 2 Rn+1++ : p^0+  +p^n = 1g.
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Thus, assumption T1 is satised as long as f() = 0 on [0; "] for some minimum risk-aversion " 2
(0; 1). When the agent is risk-neutral, then the principal would be willing to oer an actuarially
fair contract to the agent. By continuous completion for " ! 0+ (or, alternately, by imposing a
very small capital cost on the principal), we can include risk-neutral agents who are then oered a
zero contract. Using the optimality conditions in Theorem 2 and Corollary 1, we nd that the Lie
product R = ['x;] vanishes identically, so by Remark 3:
(x0   yi) 0 = f(p0'i   pi)  i 'i =
 
1  e (x0 yi)p0f + (p0=pi)i
e (x0 yi)
; i 2 f1; : : : ; ng; (4.18)
where 'i =  (pi=p0) v(x0   yi; ) and i =  (pi=p1)(yi=y1)(y1   yi)v(y1   yi; ) using the abbre-
viation yi  Li   xi  0.
Full Coverage. One immediate solution of (4.18) is yi = Li   xi = x0, for all i 2 f1; : : : ; ng,
which yields full coverage for the participating agent types.19 The lowest participating type 0
in the full-coverage scenario is determined by setting that agent's insurance premium equal to
his \certainty equivalent." The latter corresponds to the agent's compensating variation for the
insurance contract, so necessarily x0 = C(L1   x0; : : : ; Ln   x0; 0), which in turn implies that
x0 = g(0) 
(
ln( r(0))=0; if 0 2 (0; 1];
L; if 0 = 0;
where L =
Pn
i=1 piLi denotes the agent's expected loss.
20 The principal's expected payo under
full coverage is V (x; 0) = (x0  L)(1 F (0)), so that the optimal participation threshold becomes
the global solution of a scalar maximization problem on an interval (for details, see [18]):
0 2 arg max
02[0;1]

(g(0)  L)(1  F (0))
	
:
As a result, the optimal (constant) schedule is x = (x0; L1   x1; : : : ; Ln   xn), where x0 = g(0)
and xi = Li x0 for i 2 f1; : : : ; ng. The full-coverage solution leads to no information revelation at
all, as all the agent types are oered the same contract. This is also referred to as \bunching" [4].
Partial Coverage. Based on the available optimality conditions it may be possible to construct
another solution to the optimal insurance problem, which involves at least partial information
revelation. Indeed, for a given  2 (0; 1], provided that  = 0 and ()  p0f()= 0() > 1=,
there is a negative solution to (4.18), i.e., there exists a  = () < 0 such that
 =

e   1

: (4.19)
In this case, the solution  = x0   yi = x0 + xi   Li < 0 is independent of i 2 f1; : : : ; ng.
For () 2 [0; 1=], the only solution to (4.19) is  = 0, reverting back to the full-insurance regime
(for that agent type ). Because by the transversality condition (C1) it is  0(1) = 0 , this implies
that for large enough agent types  the principal may nd it optimal to use partial coverage.
We now continue to follow the solution algorithm outlined in Remark 3, via (3.1) and (3.9).
Indeed, the law of motion in (3.1), together with _xi = _   _x0 for all i 2 f1; : : : ; ng, implies that
_x0 = '(x; )  ( _x1; : : : ; _xn) =

_   _x0
 nX
i=1
'i(x; ) =  
1 p0
p0
v(; ) _
1  1 p0p0 v(; )
=
1 p0
p0
_
e + 1 p0p0
: (4.20)
19By the adjoint equation (C1), it is  0 = (1  F )p0 and  i =  (1  F )pi on [0 ; 1] for all i 2 f1; : : : ; ng.
(Thus, nontriviality (C5) holds.) Theorem 3 yields () =  0()'1(x
(); ) +  1() = 0 for all  2 [0 ; 1].
20By l'Ho^pital's rule and the denition of r, it is lim0!0+ ln( r(0))=0 = r0(0)=r(0) = L.
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Using again the law of motion, the rst component of the adjoint equation (3.9) becomes
 
_ 0
 0
=
p0f
 0
+ ('x(x; )u)0 = +
v(; )
p0
nX
i=1
piui =    _x0: (4.21)
Since on the one hand _ 0= 0 = ( _f=f)  ( _=), by the denition of , and since on the other hand
_

=

1  e
 _

+
e
1  e ;
by virtue of (4.19), one obtains|taking account of (4.20)|that relation (4.21) is equivalent to
 
_f
f
=  
_

+    _x0 =  

1 +
 e
1  e
 _

  
1  e  
 _
1 + p01 p0 e

:
But the last equation implies an initial-value problem,
_ =

1

+
e
1  e +
(1  p0)
(1  p0) + p0e
 1 _f
f
  
1  e
!
; (0) = 0; (4.22)
where the initial value is equal to the certainty equivalent of the marginal agent's exposure condi-
tional on a loss,21
0 =  
ln
Pn
i=1
pie
Li
1 p0


< 0;
thus rendering the contract worthless for the type 0, and consequently: x0(0) = 0.
5. Conclusion
The solution to multiattribute screening problems with one-dimensional types and type-dependent
participation constraints can be obtained using optimality conditions derived from a nonstandard
version of Pontryagin's maximum principle.22 Contrary to the extant literature on screening, we
do not assume representations of preferences that are quasilinear in the numeraire attribute, thus
allowing for arbitrary risk proles. We also do not require payo functions to be supermodular in
all nonmonetary attributes but impose incentive compatibility as a nonlocal constraint. We have
shown that a solution to the multiattribute screening problem, in the case where the incentive-
compatibility constraint is binding, can be obtained by solving a sequence of relaxed screening
problems, in which constraint violations are increasingly penalized. The results depend in essence
only on the convexity of the participation set23 and on (local) incentive regularity (where needed).
Thus, even if A1{A2 and P1{P2 are not satised everywhere, one may use our results to construct
solutions and then verify the assumptions in a neighborhood of the obtained solutions ex post. We
further show that the dimensionality of the 2(n + 1)-dimensional Hamiltonian system can often
be reduced signicantly in concrete problems (e.g., to a 1-dimensional dierential equation in our
optimal-insurance application in Section 4).
21The agent's expected utility is U(x; ) = p0v( x0; )+(1 p0)v( x0; ) =
 
p0 + (1  p0)e 

v( x0; ).
22Type-dependent participation constraints arise when agents have heterogeneous outside options, as il-
lustrated in Section 4.
23If U   r is quasiconcave in  (instead of nondecreasing) the participation set is of the form [0; 1] and 1
becomes subject to optimization, leading to an additional transversality condition analogous to C3.
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Appendix: Proof of Theorem 2
P r o o f. The argument proceeds in six steps (cf. [7, 8, 19,20]). For any (x; ) 2 Rn+1 , let
g(x; ) = min
^20
n
(^   )

U(x
(^); )  U(x; )
o
:
Step 1: Approximate the problem (P) by a sequence of relaxed problems

(Pk)
	
k1.
We approximate the principal's screening problem (P) by a sequence of problems (Pk), k =
1; 2; : : :, in each of which the constraints are relaxed. The sequence of relaxed problems approxi-
mates the original problem, since deviations from the constraints and the optimal control u are
penalized using successively increasing weights. We rst x the positive numbers ", , and
u  2 + ess sup
20
ku()k;
relative to which the sequence f(Pk)g1k=1 of relaxed problems will be dened. For any k  1, let
V k(x; u; ) = V (x; )  ku()  u()k2   kg (x; )2; (5.1)
where g  = minfg; 0g takes on nonzero (negative) values whenever the relevant constraint (3.2) of
the original problem (P) is violated. Similarly, for any 0 2  and x

2 Rn+1+ we set
K(x

; 0) = (minf0; 0g)2 + (U(x

; 0)  r(0))2 (5.2)
to penalize deviations from the endpoint constraints (including 0  0) imposed in the original
problem. We are now ready to formulate the relaxed problem (Pk) for any k  1, given an optimal
solution (x; u; 0) 2 D to the original problem (P):8>>>>><>>>>>:
sup(x;u;0;x

)2D^
nR 1
0
V k(x(); u(); ) dF ()  (x

  x

)2   (0   0)2   kK(x; 0)
o
s.t.
_x = u; x(0) = x

;
"  kx  xk1 + (x

  x

)2 + (0   0)2;
u 2 U ;
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
(Pk)
where D^ = DRn+1+ is an augmented domain of admissibility, U = fu^ 2 Rn : ku^k  ug is a control-
constraint set, and x

 = x(0) is the bundle oered to the optimal marginal agent type. We denote
a solution to the relaxed problem (Pk) by (x
k; uk; k0 ; x
k). By setting uk to zero for all  =2 [k0 ; 1]
we extend any such solution to all types in  (containing the optimal interval [k0 ; 1]), so the state
trajectory xk is constant on [0; k0 ].
Optimal Multiattribute Screening 101
Step 2: Show that each problem (Pk) has a solution.
For any k  1, there exists a solution (xk; uk; k0 ; x
k) to the relaxed problem (Pk). Let
f(xk;j; uk;j; k;j0 ; x
k;j)g1j=1
be an admissible maximizing sequence [21, p. 193] for the problem (Pk). Since u
k;j takes values
in the closed ball of Rn at 0 of radius u, and a forteriori the contract space (which contains all
bundles that can actually be transacted between principal and agent) is bounded by T1,24 this
maximizing sequence is uniformly bounded, which allows the following three conclusions for an
appropriate subsequence (and for simplicity we identify our original maximizing sequence with this
subsequence by relabelling indices if necessary). First, from the denition of an admissible sequence
fxk;jg1j=1 W1;1 and the uniform boundedness of f _xk;jg1j=1 this sequence of state trajectories is
equicontinuous, so by the Arzela|Ascoli theorem [22, Part I, p. 54] it converges uniformly to x^k.
Second, we obtain pointwise convergence of (x

k;j ; k;j0 ) to (x^
k; ^k0) as j !1. Third, since the space
of admissible controls L1 is a subset of the Hilbert space L2 (which can be identied with its dual),
uk;j converges weakly to u^k as j !1.25
We now show that in fact the above limits coincide with the solution to (Pk), i.e.,
(xk; uk; k0 ; x
k) = (x^k; u^k; ^k0 ; x^
k): (5.3)
For any  2 [k0 ; 1] it is
xk;j() = xk;j(k;j0 ) +
Z 
k;j0
(xk;j(#); #)uk;j(#) d#;
so by taking the limit for j !1:
x^k() = x^k(^k0) +
Z 
^k0
(x^k(#); #)u^k(#) d#:
Hence, the limiting tuple (x^k; u^k; ^k0 ; x^
k) is consistent with the Cauchy problem for the state evolu-
tion, i.e., it satises
_^xk = u^k; x^k(^k0) = x^
k:
The state constraint "  kx^k   xk1 +
x^

k   x


2 + ^k0   02 is satised by uniform con-
vergence of the maximizing sequence. Lastly, the control constraint u^k 2 U is satised, since
each uk;j, j = 1; 2; : : :, is feasible (u has been chosen appropriately large). The weak convergence
uk;j
w! u^k as j ! 1 implies, by Mazur's compactness theorem [23, p. 254], that there exists a
sequence fvk;jg1j=1 with elements in the convex hull co fuk;jg1j=1 which converges strongly to u^k
in Ln2 (). We therefore obtain that equation (5.3) holds, i.e., the limit point (x^
k; u^k; ^k0 ; x^
k) of the
maximizing sequence describes an admissible solution to the relaxed problem (Pk).
Step 3: Show that the solutions of (Pk)k1 converge to the solution of (P).
As before, there exists an admissible tuple (x^; u^; ^0) 2 D such that xk  x^k, uk w! u^, and k0 ! ^k0 .
We now show that
(x^; u^; ^0) = (x
; u; 0); (5.4)
i.e., in particular that xk  x, uk w! u, and k0 ! 0.
24The assumption T1 is used here to guarantee the boundedness of the rst (numeraire) component of the
attribute schedule, as its dynamics in (3.1) are not directly governed by the control variable.
25By the Banach|Alaoglu theorem the unit ball in L2 is weakly
 (and therefore weakly) compact, so by
the Eberlein|Smulian theorem it is also weakly sequentially compact [23, p. 229/248]. This property of
reexive Banach spaces can also be deduced from the uniform boundedness principle [24, Ch. 2].
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Let k(x; u; 0; x

) =
R 1
0
V k(x(); u(); ) dF () kx

 x

k2  (0  0)2 kK(x; 0). As a conse-
quence of the uniform boundedness of the state-control trajectories, there exists a constant M > 0
such that M  k(xk; uk; k0 ; x
k) for all k. Since k(xk; uk; k0 ; x
k)  k(x; u; 0 ; x
)  0, it is
M
k

Z 1
k0


k

kuk   uk2 + g2 

dF () +

1
k
kx

k   x

k2 + (k0   0)2

+K(x

k; k0)  0:
Taking the limit for k !1, by continuity of K it is K(x^

; ^0) = 0, i.e., (x^

; ^0) satises the endpoint
constraints U(x^

; ^0) = r(^0) and ^0  0. Moreover,
lim
k!1
Z 1
k0
 
g (x
k; )
2
dF () = 0:
Since the type distribution F has full support  (no type can be excluded for sure), it is
g (x
k; ) = 0:
Hence, g(xk; ) = 0, which is equivalent to(
^ >  ) U(x(^); )  U(xk(); );
^   ) U(x(^); )  U(xk(); );
for all ; ^ 2 . Because U is by assumption twice dierentiable, and U(x; ) is Lipschitz-continuous
in x, there exists a constant L > 0 such that jU(x; )   U(y; )j  Lkx   yk for all x; y in the
relevant (by assumption T1 bounded) contract space X and all  2 . For ^ >  this means that
U(x
k(^); ) + Lkx   xkk  U(xk(^); ) +

U(x
(^); )  U(xk(^); )

 U(xk(); );
and, for ^ < , that
U(x
k(^); )  Lkx   xkk  U(xk(^); ) +

U(x
(^); )  U(xk(^); )

 U(xk(); ):
Hence, it is
min
^20
n
(^   )

U(x
(^); )  U(x(); )
o
  L";
and for "! 0+ the limit (x^; u^; ^0; x^

) becomes admissible in problem (P). This implies
(x; u; 0; x
)  (x^; u^; ^0; x^

): (5.5)
On the other hand, k(xk; uk; k0 ; x
k)  k(x; u; 0 ; x
) =: (x; u; 0; x
) = V (x; 0), whence
(xk; uk; k0 ; x
k)  kx

k   x

k2   (k0   0)2   
Z 1
k0
kuk   uk2 dF ()  (x; u; 0; x
)
for all k  1. Hence, taking the limit for k !1 yields
(x^; u^; x^

; ^0) 

^0   0
2
   lim
k!1
Z
0
kuk   uk2 dF ()  (x; u; 0; x
);
which together with (5.5) implies that ^0 = 

0, u^ = u
, and
lim
k!1
Z

kuk   uk2 dF () = 0;
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so the sequence fukg1k=1 converges to u a.e. on .
Step 4: Show that the problem (Pk) becomes a standard OCP (P
0
k) for large k.
Because of the uniform convergence of the optimal state-trajectories xk and the pointwise con-
vergence of the boundary points k0 (as k ! 1) to the corresponding optimal state trajectory x
and optimal boundary point 0 of the original problem (P), the state constraint in the relaxed
problem (Pk) is strictly not binding for large enough k, i.e.,
" > kxk   xk1 +
 
k0   0
2
;
as long as k is suciently large. Hence, for xed constants ", , and u there exists a k0 = k0("; ; u) 
1 such that for all k  k0 the problem (Pk) can be rewritten equivalently in the form8><>:
sup(x;u;0;x

)2D^
nR 1
0
V k(x(); u(); ) dF ()  kx

  x

k2   (0   0)2   kK(x; 0)
o
s.t.
_x = u; x(0) = x

:
9>=>; (P0k)
Necessary optimality conditions based on the maximum principle [7] for problem (P
0
k) are readily
available.
Step 5: Obtain necessary optimality conditions for (P
0
k).
We provide here a version of the maximum principle by Milyutin and Osmolovskii [25, P. 24{25].26
Let
Hk(x; u; ; k0 ;  
k) = k0V
kf +  k  u
be the Hamiltonian function associated with problem (P
0
k), where 
k
0 2 R is a constant multiplier,
 k 2 Rn+1 is an adjoint variable, and x is the state of the system. The Hamiltonian corresponds
to the instantaneous payo to the principal including the current benet of state velocities. The
shadow prices of these are measured by the adjoint variables k0 and  
k respectively.
Maximum Principle for Problem (P
0
k). If (x
k; uk; k0 ; x
k) is an optimal solution for the
problem (P
0
k), then there exists an absolutely continuous function  
k : [k0 ; 1] ! Rn+1, and a con-
stant k0 > 0, such that the following relations hold.
1. Adjoint Equation:
  _ k() = Hkx(xk(); uk(); ; k0 ;  k()) (5.6)
2. State Transversality:
 k(k0) = 2k
 
U(x

k; k0)  r(k0)

Ux(x

k; k0) + 2
 
x

k   x

 (5.7)
 k(1) = 0 (5.8)
3. Maximality:
uk() 2 argmax
u2U
Hk(xk(); u; ; k0 ;  
k()) a.e. on [k0 ; 1] (5.9)
One can extend the standard maximum principle comprised by the above conditions, and obtain
the following type-transversality condition.
4. Type Transversality:
2
 
kminfk0 ; 0g+ k
 
U(x

k; k0)  r(k0)
  
U(x

k; k0)  _r(k0)

+ (k0   0)

+ supu2U Hk(x
k; u; k0 ; 
k
0;  
k(k0)) = 0:

(5.10)
26They consider a slightly more general Mayer problem. Problem (P
0
k) is a Bolza problem on a variable
interval, which can be reduced to a Mayer problem (in which the objective function depends only on the
endpoints of the state trajectory) by introducing an additional real-valued state variable.
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The type-transversality condition is crucial for determining the missing multiplier associated with
the optimization of the participation set in the principal's screening problem. To prove type
transversality, consider some real  (with j j suciently small), and let
!^k0 () = (x
k(k0 + ); 
k
0 + );
and
^k() =
Z 1
k0+
k0V
k(xk(); uk(); ) dF ()  k!^k0 ()  (x
; 0)k2   kK(!^k0 ());
where if necessary we extend the state-control trajectory beyond the lowest participating type.
Then by optimality of k0 ,
0  ^k2(0)  ^k2()
=
Z k0+
k0
k0V
k(xk; uk; ) dF () +
 k!^k0 ()  (x; 0)k2   k(xk   x; k0   0)k2
+k
 
K(!^k0 ()) K(x
k; k0 )

=
Z k0+
k0
 
k0V
kf +
 
2
 
xk()  x

+ kKx

(xk(); )
  _xk() + 2(   0) + kK0(xk(); ) d
=
Z k0+
k0

Hk(xk; uk; ; k0 ;  
k)

 k=2(xk() x

)+kKx

(xk();)
+ kK0(x
k(); )

d + 2(k0   0) + 2

Z k0+
k0

sup
u2U
Hk(xk; u; ; k0 ; 2
 
xk   x

+ kKx

(xk; )) + kK0(x
k(); )

d + 2(k0   0) + 2:
By the rst mean-value theorem for the integral [26, p. 352], the last integral can be written in the
form 
sup
u2U
Hk
 
x(k0 ); u;
k0 ; 
k
0 ; 2
 
xk(k0 )  x
+ kKx

(xk(k0 );
k0 )

+ kK0(x
k(k0 );
k0 )


for some appropriate k0 2 [k0 ; k0 +  ]. Hence, dividing the previous inequality by  > 0 and
subsequently taking the limit for  ! 0+ yields
0  sup
u2U
Hk(xk; u; ; k0; 2

x

k   x



+ kKx

(x

k; k0)) + kK0(x
k; k0) + 2(
k
0   0): (5.11)
Consider now the case where we extend the type interval by an increment ^ > 0 to the left beyond
the optimal lowest type k0 , which corresponds to  < 0 in the above relations. If we set ^ =   > 0,
then it is (using our earlier computations)
0   
Z k0
k0 ^

Hk(xk; uk; ; k0;  
k)

 k=2(xk() x

)+kKx

(xk();)
+ kK0(x
k(); )

d 2(k0 0)^+^2;
where we can extend uk(), for all  2 [k0   ^ ; k0 ] to the left. In particular, the latter extension
can be performed such that
 

sup
u2U
Hk
 
xk; u; ; k0 ; kKx

(xk(); )
 Hk  xk; uk; ; k0 ; kKx

(xk(); )

on the interval [k0   ^ ; k0 ] for some arbitrary  > 0. Hence,
0   

sup
u2U
Hk(xk(k0 ); u;
k0 ; 
k
0 ; 2
 
xk(k0 )  x
+ kKx

(xk(k0 );
k0 ))  + kK0(xk(k0 ); k0 ) + 2(k0   0)

^+^2;
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for some k0 2 [k0 ^ ; k0 ], so by dividing through ^ > 0 and taking the limits for ^ ! 0+ and ! 0+,
we get
0  sup
u2U
Hk(x

k; u; k0 ; 
k
0; 2

x

k   x



+ kKx

(x

k; k0)) + kK0(x
k; k0) + 2(
k
0   0): (5.12)
Relations (5.11) and (5.12), together with (5.7), are equivalent to (5.10).
Using the above extended maximum principle (5.6){(5.10) for the relaxed problem (P
0
k), one
obtains the adjoint equation
  _ k = k0Vxf + kgx +  k 
 
xu
k

= k0Vxf + 
kgx +  
k
0'xu
k (5.13)
on , where
k() =

 2kk0g (xk; );  2 [k0 ; 1];
0; otherwise:
(5.14)
The maximality condition (5.9) constitutes a constrained optimization problem, for which there
exists a Lagrange multiplier &k = &k() such that
 0'i +  i   2k0(uki   ui ) + 2&kuki = 0
for all i 2 f1; : : : ; ng, with complementary slackness &k  kukk   u = 0. By Step 3 we know
that uk ! u a.e. on . Hence, by Egorov's theorem [27, p. 24] for any  > 0 there is a subset 
of , such that
R
n d <
 and uk  u uniformly on . Since u is feasible, this uniform
convergence implies that uk =2 @U on  for k large enough. By virtue of complementary slackness,
the corresponding Lagrange multipliers &k and k therefore vanish on , as long as k is large
enough. In other words,
 0'i +  i   2k0(uk   u) = 0 (5.15)
a.e. on  for all i 2 f1; : : : ; ng, as long as k is large enough.
Step 6: Derive necessary optimality conditions for (P).
The sequence fk0g1k=1 is uniformly bounded and f kg1k=1 is also equicontinuous. Hence we conclude,
as before (in Step 2), that there exist  ";u and ;u, such that
 k   ;u; k0 ! ;u:
As already indicated through the notation, the limits  ;u and ;u generically depend on the
constants  and u. More specically, these limits correspond to the optimal solution to the screening
problem (P) if we replace V by V   ku  uk2 and introduce the additional constraint kuk  u.
Adjoint Equation. Since by the maximum principle for problem (P
0
k) (cf. Step 5) it is 
k
0 >
0, relations (5.6){(5.8) are positively homogeneous of degree one in  k=k0 , and relation (5.9) is
positively homogeneous of degree zero, it is possible to multiply equations (5.6){(5.8) with positive
numbers (and relabel the variables k0 and  
k back), such that
0 < k0 + max
2[k0 ;1]
k k()k2 +
Z 1
k1
 
k()
2
d  1: (5.16)
Integrating the components of the adjoint equation (5.13) yields (using the state-transversality
condition (5.8))
 k() =
Z 1

 
k0Vxf +  
k
0'xu
k

d +
Z 1

kgxd (5.17)
for all  2  (using the standard extension from [k0 ; 1] to  explained in Step 1).
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Consider now a Borel measure with density given k by (5.14).27 By abuse of notation we denote
this measure also by k. The Borel measure k is nonnegative by construction and bounded as a
consequence of (5.16). Thus, there exists a Borel measure , such that (passing to a subsequence
if necessary) k
w!  as k !1.
Since the total variation of  k on  is uniformly bounded for all k by (5.16) (for every ab-
solutely continuous function is of bounded variation on a compact interval [28, p. 412]), and the
sequence f kg is also uniformly bounded as a consequence of (5.17), by Helly's selection princi-
ple [28, p. 398] there exists a function  ^, so (a subsequence of) the sequence f kg converges to  ^.
By taking the limit in (5.17) for k !1 we thus obtain
 ^x() =
Z 1


0Vxf +  ^  x

d +
Z 1

gxd; (5.18)
for almost all  2 0, where  ^ =  ;u. The adjoint equation C1 then follows by noting that (using
the envelope theorem) gx(x
(); ) =   ((x(); )  )Ux(x(); ).
Maximality. Consider the maximality condition (5.15) for Problem (Pk), which holds for k
large enough. Since xk  x and uk ! u (a.e. on ) for k ! 1, we obtain the maximality
condition C2.
Transversality. Since k0 ! 0 as k tends to innity (cf. Step 3), by setting
1 =   lim
k!1
2k
 
U(x

k; k0)  r(k0)

and 2 =   lim
k!1
2kminfk0 ; 0g
we obtain from the state-transversality condition (5.7) for k ! 1 (taking into account the maxi-
mality condition C2) that
 (0) =  1Ux(x
; 0); (5.19)
and from the type transversality condition (5.10) that
 1 (U(x

; 0)  _r(0))  2 + 0V (x
; 0) = 0: (5.20)
If 0 > 0, then by the denition of 2 it is 2 = 0. Combining relations (5.19) and (5.20) for 2 = 0
yields the transversality condition C3 (ii). If on the other hand 0 = 0, then we obtain the
transversality condition C3 (i) from relation (5.19) directly.
27Recall [29, Ch. 1] that all Borel measures  on  form a linear normed space with norm
kk = sup
h2C[0;1]:khk1=1
Z 1
0
h(#) d(#):
Interpreting the above Stieltjes integral as a scalar product, we can think of any Borel measure  as an
element of the dual space (C[0; 1]). A sequence of Borel measures 1; 2; : : : weak-converges to  if for
all h 2 C[0; 1], Z 1
0
h(#) dk(#) !
Z 1
0
h(#) d(#);
as k !1. Since C[0; 1] is separable, by the theorem of choice every (bounded) sequence of measures has a
weak-convergent subsequence [30, p. 64; 31, p. 189]. Since for any h 2 C[0; 1] the function R 
0
h(#) d(#) is
continuous a.e. on , for any sequence of points fkg1k=1 with limit , for almost every such  2  it is:
lim
k!1
Z k
0
h(#) d(#) =
Z 
0
h(#) d(#):
Moreover, if in addition the sequence fkg1k=0 of Borel measures has the Borel measure  as its limit, then
lim
k!1
Z k
0
h(#) dk(#) =
Z 
0
h(#) d(#)
for almost every  2 .
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Complementary Slackness. The denition (5.14) of the measure k, and the fact that k
w! 
as k !1 (cf. also footnote 27) yields the complementary slackness condition C4.
Nontriviality. If 0 and  are trivial, then (0;  ) must vanish identically on 

0. From the
adjoint equation C1 it follows that Z 1

gx(x
(#); #) d(#) = 0
for all  2 0. By the complementary slackness condition C4, whenever () 6= 0 it is also
g(x(); ) = 0. This implies that Z 1
0
d = 0:
On the other hand, it is possible to renormalize the middle term in (5.16) in the solution of the
approximate problem (Pk) such that
k0 + max
2[k0 ;1]
k k()k2 +
Z 1
k0
+
 
k()
2
d = 1
for any k  1. By taking the limit for k !1,Z 1
0
(())
2
d = 1:
By the nonnegativity of the measure , this yields a contradiction. Hence, the incentive regularity
condition A3 ensures that (0;  ) does not vanish identically on the optimal participation set 

0,
which implies the nontriviality condition C5. 
